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BEYOND ATTICUS FINCH: LESSONS ON ETHICS AND




This article explores the portrayal of lawyers and judges in postcolo-
nial literature,' an intersection between law and literature often ignored in
legal scholarship, and asks what these stories offer to our collective under-
standing of the fundamental disconnect between the rule of law (or one's
role in the law) and individual morality. The failure to adequately con-
sider postcolonial literature is especially true of the Western (i.e. North
America and Western Europe) legal academy, which tends to focus heav-
ily on Western literature concerning this sort of inquiry. a For example,
the mere mention of Atticus Finch from Harper Lee's To Kill a Mocking-
bird conjures the image of the ultimate attorney, an ideal frequently
praised-and occasionally criticized-in Western commentaries on legal
ethics and professionalism. 3 Indeed, the benefits of studying literary law-
yers like Finch and others from Western literature are well documented by
legal scholars who contend that such study: (1) provides insights about the
practice of law and its effects on individuals, (2) enhances our capacity for
sensitivity to oppression or injustice through imagination and new experi-
ences, (3) challenges established thought, and (4) adds variety in the law
school curriculum, among other virtues. 4 Little attention, however, has
* Lecturer in Law, Michigan State University College of Law; J.D. University of Chicago Law
School (1999); B.A. North Park College (1996).
1. Conceding, of course, the concerns we might have trying to define what is meant by "post-
colonial," in using the term the author refers to literature written in the past half-century by authors
from formerly colonized countries who address, in some way, the legacy of colonialism. For further
discussion regarding the difficulties of defining the term "postcolonial," see infra note 52 and accom-
panying text.
2. As an illustration, a Westlaw search for articles discussing Atticus Finch alone-not to men-
tion other Western legal characters-resulted in 632 documents (search performed July 10, 2007, of
Westlaw database TP-All for "Atticus Finch "), compared to 21 articles referencing the general catego-
ries of postcolonial literature or postcolonial fiction (search performed July 10, 2007, of Westlaw
database TP-ALL for postcolonial w15 literature fiction).
3. See infra Part lI.B.
4. Philip C. Kissam, Disturbing Images: Literature in a Jurisprudence Course, 22 LEGAL STUD.
F. 329, 329-30 (1998).
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been devoted by Western legal scholars to the lawyers depicted in post-
colonial literature even though, as this article will demonstrate, a number
of excellent options exist for such an inquiry.
Four characters from postcolonial fiction are studied here in an effort
to uncover the lessons they hold that might be different from the lessons
we learn through the Atticus Finches of the literary world. Two of the
characters are lawyers and two are adjudicators-a civil magistrate and a
judge. Each character represents unique aspects of the colonizing power's
influence-one a bright star in the aftermath of decolonialization, one a
cynical beneficiary of the colonizer's purported affirmative action efforts,
one a complicit yet conflicted arm of the empire, and one an activist striv-
ing to repair the ravages of apartheid in her country. Though the details
of the characters' stories are quite different, the characters share one
common theme: the struggle of reconciling the disconnect between obliga-
tions to the law and convictions of morality. While not all these literary
legal figures necessarily are successful in their efforts to reconcile this
disconnect, each character offers lessons for lawyers-to-be, lawyers, and
readers generally regarding law and morality.
This study leads to two main conclusions. First, on a broad level,
these stories illustrate the failings of law when, at times, the law simply is
unable to address completely a particular predicament. Second, the stories
offer an alternative perspective, through the lens of postcolonialism,
through which to better comprehend and appreciate lawyers' choices when
pursuing justice and when the law conflicts with norms or values. Such
findings are important and relevant to both practitioners and students, if
they desire to balance legal obligations and ethical duties and if they desire
to have meaningful and rewarding careers.
Law and literature scholars advocate for the inclusion of literature in
legal study for many reasons. For the purposes of this article literature
reveals lessons concerning lawyers who face conflicts between their role in
the law and their moral compasses. Part II of this article reviews the
study of lawyers portrayed in literature. More specifically, Part II identi-
fies the ways a study of literature can respond to the disconnect between
lawyers' responsibilities to the rule of law and to individual morality, and
it examines postcolonial fiction's lessons about the issue, beyond those
provided by the standard Western literary selections. Part III of the article
analyzes the stories of four legal figures in postcolonial literature, thereby
illustrating the lessons that may be learned from these legal figures' at-
tempts to reconcile individual values and beliefs with the rule of law and
with professional norms. Part IV of the article concludes by observing
that postcolonial literature may aid law students, practitioners, and read-
ers as a whole.
[Vol. 32:37
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II. WHY STUDY LITERARY LAWYERS
Commentators cite numerous justifications for studying law and litera-
ture, a complete discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article.
As an initial matter, the focus in this article is the study of law in literature
(or perhaps more accurately lawyers in literature) as opposed to the study
of law as literature.6 In particular, this article analyzes how literature
helps attorneys resolve the divergence between one's role in the law and
one's moral compass. To understand literature's role in this regard, the
article first examines this disconnect and then explores how literature,
especially postcolonial literature, offers an alternative means for explor-
ing, if not resolving, the disconnect.
A. Disconnect and Dissatisfaction: Necessary Consequences of
Being a Lawyer?
It is no secret that many lawyers are less than satisfied with their ca-
reers. 7 A number of commentators have examined the reasons for lawyer
dissatisfaction.8 One recurring theme seems to be that lawyers, and espe-
cially recent law school graduates, feel they are "losing themselves" 9 or
must sacrifice their pre-lawyer values and beliefs.1° The traditional case-
book method of law school training provides little, if any, instruction for
5. See infra Part lI.B.
6. For an explanation of the differences between the study of law as literature vs. law in litera-
ture, see RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATIONSHIP 14-21
(Harvard Univ. Press 1988).
7. Martin E.P. Seligman, Paul R. Verkuil & Terry H. Kang, Why Lawyers are Unhappy, 23
CARDOZO L. REv. 33, 36 (2001) (The authors observe: "Practitioners have increasingly acknowledged
that law is a profession in crisis, and the crisis they speak of relates to the widespread disenchantment
among even the most talented lawyers. This undercurrent of dissatisfaction cannot be ignored or
hidden by the many rueful jokes often told by lawyers about lawyers. Among practitioners responding
to a 1992 poll, 52 percent described themselves as dissatisfied, and many are retiring early or leaving
the profession altogether.") (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession,
68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 91-113 (1994) (describing the causes of dissatisfaction as (1) the hired gun
approach to litigation, (2) materialism and billable hours, (3) commercialization, advertising and the
contingent fee, (4) lawyer explosion and the media, (5) litigation explosion, and (6) lawyer compe-
tence); Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Un-
healthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871 (1999) (discussing the widespread depres-
sion, anxiety, alcoholism, and other sources of unhappiness among attorneys); Susan Daicoff, Asking
Leopards to Change Their Spots: Should Lawyers Change? A Critique of Solutions to Problems with
Professionalism by Reference to Empirically-Derived Attorney Personality Attributes, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 547 (1998) (noting the decline of professionalism and public opinion of attorneys,
along with increased dissatisfaction and dysfunction among attorneys).
9. Robert Kurson, Who's Killing the Great Lawyers of Harvard?, ESQUIRE, Aug. 2000, at 82.
10. See, e.g., Lawrence S. Krieger, The Inseparability of Professionalism and Personal Satisfac-
tion: Perspectives on Values, Integrity and Happiness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 426 (2005) (argu-
ing "that depression and unprofessional behavior among law students and lawyers typically proceed
from a loss of integrity-a disconnection from intrinsic values and motivations, personal and cultural
beliefs, conscience, or other defining parts of their personality and humanity").
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lawyers-to-be concerning how to avoid feeling disconnected from one's
former self while becoming a lawyer. Indeed, this method of instruction
has been cited as a very cause of the disconnect." The only required law
school course that might even begin to approach the topic of attorney dis-
satisfaction is professional responsibility, but students complain that pro-
fessional responsibility courses do little to prepare them for the real issues
faced in practice, such as situations where the law diverges from moral-
ity.12  Once in practice, lawyers find even fewer opportunities for reflec-
tion on ethical dilemmas or career satisfaction.
What exactly is this losing of oneself? What is the disconnect between
the individual-self and the lawyer-self? Many are quick to identify the
number of hours attorneys work, especially young associates employed by
top law firms.13  Yet, this disconnect may run much deeper than long
hours. Instead, it may stem from conflict between legal or professional
obligations and moral conscience or identity. It is not uncommon to hear
law students and lawyers talk of the dual, competing roles between the self
as an individual and the self as a lawyer. Students frequently express this
sentiment about their law school experiences generally, and it is evident in
several of the mandates placed upon lawyers by the ethical rules and the
culture of the profession. For example, the ABA Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules) in some circumstances allow or require cli-
ent confidentiality to be maintained at the expense of a third party's well
being.14 The Model Rules also permit representation of a client whose
11. See, e.g., Note, Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the Pacification of Law Students, 111
HARV. L. REv. 2027, 2029-30 (1998) (concluding that law students become separated from an "initial
commitment to use the law to help people and to further a social justice agenda" due to the method of
law school instruction, and that students "consequently become alienated from their former ideals")
(citation omitted).
12. For a discussion of students' complaints about the insufficient integration of ethical lessons
into the law school curriculum, see Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, "It's Hard to be a Human
Being and a Lawyer": Young Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Prac-
tice, 105 W. VA. L. REv. 495, 499-500 (2003). Students' general dislike of legal ethics or profes-
sional responsibility courses apparently has not improved over the years. Id. at 500 (quoting Ronald
Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Circular Paradox, 2 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 247, 258 (1979) for his observation that students perceive "legal ethics courses as requiring
less time, as substantially easier, as less well taught and as a less valuable use of class time than their
other course work").
13. while it is true that lawyers work long hours, they are not the only professionals with enor-
mous demands on their time. Doctors, teachers, scientists, engineers, and many others all work long
hours, often under stressful conditions, and yet we do not hear similar concerns over the loss of self.
This is not to say that other professions do not have concerns about work conditions, nor to make
generalized stereotypes regarding this point. Instead, it merely seems that lawyers do seem unique in
raising this particular concern.
14. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6 (2007) ("A lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the
disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted
by paragraph (b), [which provides, in relevant part, that]: A lawyer may reveal information relating to
the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime
[Vol. 32:37
HeinOnline -- 32 J. Legal Prof. 40 2008
Beyond Atticus Finch
political or moral views diverge from that of the lawyer.' 5  That the
Model Rules and other legal mandates provide for the protection of dis-
honest or violent clients is another source of tension. 16  Sissela Bok calls
this tension "going against fundamental moral constraints" and notes that
"when lawyers choose or are forced to compromise their scruples by vio-
lating such constraints, their trust in themselves can be shaken, both as
persons capable of a consistent moral stance and as individuals worthy of
trust on the part of others." 17 Some lawyers are able to move beyond
these doubts, but "others find themselves increasingly alienated from the
profession."' 8 In fact, Bok notes that many attorneys who leave the prac-
tice do so for this reason. 19
Some scholars label the process of addressing this tension or discon-
nect as role morality or role differentiation. In other words, role morality
or role differentiation occurs in "a situation in 'which the occupant of...
a role must consider the effect of disobedience on undermining various
benefits of law . . ."20 While this explanation may seem fairly straight-
forward, in practice an attorney may find role differentiation quite trou-
bling. J. Michael Martinez recognizes that the problem with "role moral-
ity is that it requires lawyers to compartmentalize their private and public
personas, to ignore their 'off-the-job values . ,,,21 This compartmen-
talization weighs heavily on many attorneys. As Martinez explains:
Because rational human beings often make decisions based on a
variety of factors including a sense of morality that they might be
hard-pressed to articulate, it is questionable whether lawyers can
or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services; [or] (3) to
prevent, mitigate or rectify [said injury] . . .") (emphasis added).
15. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.2(b) (2007) ("A lawyer's representation
of a client, including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client's
political, economic, social or moral views or activities.").
16. Gabriel Lerner makes a similar point in his article, How Teaching Political and Ethical The-
ory Could Help Solve Two of the Legal Profession's Biggest Problems, 19 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 781,
783 (2006): "[T]here is often a dissonance (or at least a perceived dissonance) between how a human
being should ethically behave and how a lawyer should ethically behave. Most people want to be
decent human beings, yet lawyers, if they make their clients' interests the highest priority, must fre-
quently do things, such as impugn the character of a truthful witness, that would be reprehensible if
done by a non-lawyer."
17. Sissela Bok, Can Lawyers Be Trusted?, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 913, 921 (1990).
18. Id.
19. Id. (referencing sources such as a Maryland State Bar Association survey that documents
causes of lawyer dissatisfaction) (citations omitted).
20. Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 n. 17 (1993) (quoting William Pow-
ers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Utilitarianism and Social
Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1264 (1979)).
21. J. Michael Martinez, Law Versus Ethics: Reconciling Two Concepts of Public Service Ethics,
29 ADMIN. & Soc'y. 690, 700 (1998) (citation omitted).
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satisfactorily and consistently divorce their private and public
selves, even if this act is considered a desirable component of the
lawyer's role morality. Critics charge that by creating a "moral
distance" between "ordinary morality" and professional responsi-
bility, the legal profession has diminished the "moral universe" of
the lawyer.22
Not only do attorneys struggle to balance their professional role with their
individual values, but society routinely condemns lawyers for engaging in
this struggle in the first place. 23  Numerous sources-from academic to
anecdotal-reveal that the public considers lawyers greedy, immoral, and
untruthful.24
Perhaps if we were more willing to examine this disconnect, then
fewer law students would find themselves disillusioned, lawyers would be
more likely to remain in practice (and to be fulfilled rather than frustrated
by the practice), and society would be more understanding of the choices
lawyers make. If role differentiation is both a necessary attribute for law-
yers and also a potential source for such despair, why is it rarely, if ever,
discussed in the classroom or the workplace? The greatest impediment to
this discussion may be the fact that law students and practitioners lack an
appropriate vehicle for broaching the subject in the first place-the very
opportunity that literature readily facilitates.
B. Literature's Redemptive Role
Law and literature proponents offer numerous reasons to justify the
presence of literature in the law school curriculum. 25 It has been recog-
nized that "[n]ovels are proven instruments to explore social and moral
issues. "26 Literature's "humanization" of the law is a common theme in
22. Id. (citations omitted).
23. Id. at 698 (observing the "hired gun effect", where society condemns lawyers as immoral and
utterly unredeemable). See also Orrin K. Ames III, Concerns About the Lack of Professionalism:
Root Causes Rather than Symptoms Must be Addressed, 28 AM. J. TRAL ADVOC. 531, 544-48 (2005)
(discussing the consequences of role differentiation and the "inherent tension between the lawyer as a
person and the lawyer as an advocate").
24. For an interesting discussion of the declining public perception of lawyers in this regard, see
Daicoff, supra note 8, at 551-53.
25. For a concise but thorough summary of justifications beyond those considered in this article,
see Kissam, supra note 4. See also Lucia A. Silecchia, Things are Seldom What They Seem: Judges
and Lawyers in the Tales of Mark Twain, 35 CONN. L. REv. 559, 566 (2003) (observing that "examin-
ing lawyerly and judicial conduct in the fictional setting has much to contribute to our understanding of
the modern legal system and its function"); POSNER, supra note 6, at 358-59 (recognizing that law
and literature deserves a place in legal teaching and research, and suggesting its inclusion in courses
such as law and literature, jurisprudence, legal process, constitutional law, torts, copyright, legal
writing, and advocacy).
26. Donald J. Polden, Introduction-Law and Literature: A Collection of Essays on John
Grisham's TJERAJNMAKER, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1251, 1255 (1996).
[Vol. 32:37
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this regard, 27 meaning that lawyers ought to read literature for its human-
izing attributes. As Robin West explains, "[]iterature helps us understand
others. Literature helps us sympathize with their pain, it helps us share
their sorrow, and it helps us celebrate their joy. It makes us more
moral. " 28 West considers this aspect of literature its single greatest con-
tribution to lawyers. 29 Literature allows the reader to enter a world closed
off by court opinions and news articles, for through literature we are able
to consider a character's internal observations and emotions.30 This is
important because the procedure and technicalities of the legal system fre-
quently discount or exclude subjective emotions like sympathy or passion.
Furthermore, reading a work of fiction permits us to venture into areas
that the constructs of daily life typically do not permit. Paul J. Heald fur-
ther contends that the study of literature is relevant to law because it ex-
plains how law connects to the way "we should live, even when legal dis-
course obscures the connection," and "[b]ecause fiction is an undeniably
rich collection of studies in the appropriateness of human action. In fact,
literature in its various forms may be a unique repository for information
capable of enriching legal decision making."
31
Martha Nussbaum powerfully argues that the study of law and litera-
ture particularly is suited for understanding ethical behavior. She suggests
that thinking about narrative literature allows for a humanistic conception
of the world around us. 32 In her words, the experience of reading
27. See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Literary Lawyer, 27 PAC. L.J. 1187, 1188 (1996) ("The good
lawyering to which we should aspire, on this view, and the aspiration for which we should instill in
students, is importantly informed not by economics, but by literary and humanistic inquiry."); William
T. Braithwaite, Why, and How, Judges Should Study Poetry, 19 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 809, 825 (1988)
("Judges should study poetry for the same reason all of us should-because from it we can learn what
it really means to be human."); Peter Goodrich, Law By Other Means, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. &
LITERATURE 111, 116 (1998) ("Law and Literature offers an alternative method for addressing the
epistemic question of how we know the diversity of laws, as well as substantive access to the disparate
social forms of legal being, of law in society. At its most radical, it proffers the possibility of law by
other means.").
28. ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY AND LAW 263 (Univ. of Michigan Press 1993).
29. See WEST, supra note 27, at 1211.
30. See Silecchia, supra note 25, at 569-73 (discussing lessons that may be drawn from legal
fiction).
31. PAUL J. HEALD, LITERATURE AND LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING: LAW AND LITERATURE AS
ETHICAL DISCOURSE 4 (Carolina Academic Press 1998).
32. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 12
(Beacon Press 1995). In support of her point Nussbaum cites WAYNE BOOTH, THE COMPANY WE
KEEP: AN ETHICS OF FICTION 70-77 (Univ. of California Press 1988), in which he "argues that the
act of reading and assessing what one has read is ethically valuable precisely because it is constructed
in a manner that demands both immersion and critical conversation, comparison of what one has read
both with one's own unfolding experience and with the responses and arguments of other readers."
Id. at 9. She concludes that thinking of reading "as combining one's own absorbed imagining with
periods of more detached (and interactive) critical scrutiny, we can already begin to see why we might
find in it an activity well suited to public reasoning in a democratic society." Id.
20081
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provides insights that should play a role (though not as uncriticized
foundations) in the construction of an adequate moral and political
theory; . . . [and that] developi] moral capabilities without which
citizens will not succeed in making reality out of the normative
conclusions of any moral or political theory, however excellent.
• . . [N]ovel-reading will not give us the whole story about social
justice, but it can be a bridge both to a vision of justice and to the
social enactment of that vision. 3
Similarly, for our purpose here, novel-reading may not provide the whole
story about how lawyers differentiate between conflicting beliefs, values,
norms, and rules, but it can inspire a vision of how these conflicts may be
reconciled and how that reconciliation may be brought to fruition.
Since the birth of the law and literature movement, academics have
analyzed the depiction of lawyers in Western literature (i.e. North Ameri-
can and British works).34 In recent years, a narrower approach has
emerged among professional responsibility scholars, who have focused on
the lessons that might be learned from lawyers and judges portrayed in
literature. The most famous example probably is Atticus Finch,35 who has
33. Id. at 12.
34. This aspect of the law and literature field is less explored than others, however. See, e.g.,
POSNER, supra note 6 at 20 (specifically excluding the depiction of lawyers in fiction from his book on
law and literature).
35. For examples of works extolling the virtues of Atticus Finch, see Gregory J. Sullivan, Chil-
dren Into Men: Lawyers and the Law in Three Novels, 37 CATH. LAW. 29, 30, 42 (1996) (examining
Atticus Finch among others to discuss one of what he calls the "central tensions in a lawyer's moral
life" - "realism" versus "romanticism", and concluding that lawyers "would do well to emulate [Atti-
cus Finch's] moral courage"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Sense and Sensibilities of Lawyers:
Lawyering in Literature, Narratives, Film and Television, and Ethical Choices Regarding Career and
Craft, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 12 (1999) (calling Atticus Finch "[p]erhaps the most revered lawyer
in modern literature"); NANCY LAWSON REMLER AND HUGH LAWSON, Situating Atticus in the Zone:
A Lawyer and His Daughter Read Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird, in LITERATURE AND LAW
207-17 (Michael J. Meyer ed., 2004) (revealing the disconnect in understanding of Atticus Finch
between a scholar of literature and a jurist); William H. Simon, Moral Pluck: Legal Ethics in Popular
Culture, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 421,421-22 (2001) (noting Kenneth Starr's use of Atticus Finch as an
ethical role model); Kristin Huston, Comment, The Lawyer as Savior: What Literature Says About the
Attorney's Role in Redemption, 73 UMKC L. REV. 161, 162 (calling Finch "the ultimate idealized
attorney"); Michael Newcity, Why is There No Russian Atticus Finch? Or Even a Russian Rumpole?,
12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 271 (2005) (considering the possibility that Western culture is unique,
leading to a myth of the lawyer as a hero that does not exist in other non-Western cultures); Edwin J.
McCreedy, Atticus Finch or My Cousin Vinny?, 231 N.J. LAW 5 (2004) (discussing the portrayal of
lawyers in popular culture, specifically T.V. and film); Thane Rosenbaum, Introduction, The Myth of
Moral Justice: Why Our Legal System Fails to Do What's Right, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y. &
ETHics J. 3 (2006) (pointing to Atticus Finch as an example of someone who does what is morally
right, though it is directly counter to what is acceptable in his community); Teresa Godwin Phelps,
Atticus, Thomas, and The Meaning of Justice, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 925 (2002) (discussing the
meaning of justice in light of Atticus' defense of Tom Robinson); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral
Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PiTT. L. REV. 181 (1981) (employing Atticus Finch as the ever-
moral lawyer to analyze dilemmas that face real lawyers in modern life). It should be noted, of
course, that Atticus Finch is not the only lawyer studied from Western classics. For just two of many
examples, see Silecchia, supra note 25 (discussing lessons to be learned from Mark Twain's literary
[Vol. 32:37
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"become so embedded in the collective consciousness as the quintessential
'good' lawyer that even a widely-adopted law school textbook treats him
as if he were real." 36 (It should be noted, however, that not all commen-
tary on Atticus Finch is entirely enthusiastic.37 ) Nevertheless, the field of
professional responsibility-that is, the ethics of being a lawyer-presents
an especially compelling subject for the analysis of literary lawyers.
The standard professional responsibility curriculum focuses almost ex-
clusively upon the Model Rules. Many students complain that this focus
lacks the intellectual rigor of other required courses, such as criminal law
or contracts. Once in practice, many students further find that an aware-
ness of the Model Rules often is insufficient for resolving the ethical di-
lemmas they encounter. As Michael E. Wolfson suggests:
Only if students can experience the contextual framework for the
kind of significant ethical dilemmas they will face in practice can
the subject of professional responsibility rise to a level comparable
to classes that students believe, sometimes wrongly, are central to
their education and the conduct of their professional lives after law
school.38
Literature provides a type of contextual framework. The importance of
the images conveyed in literature of lawyers "in action" has been ac-
knowledged by several professional responsibility and legal ethics schol-
ars, perhaps most notably by Carrie Menkel-Meadow. 39 Menkel-Meadow
explains that, "[niarratives taken from literature ...elucidate important
ethical choices - at both the macro-level of choices regarding what kind of
lawyer to be or career to pursue, and the micro-level of behavioral choices
lawyers) and Gregg Mayer, Prosecutors in Books, 19 LAW & LITERATURE 77 (2007) (discussing
prosecutors portrayed in Western literature).
36. Robert M. Jarvis, The Admiralty Lawyer in Popular Culture, 37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 23 n. 46
(2006) (citing Phelps, supra note 35, for her discussion of Thomas L. Shaffer's casebook AMERICAN
LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS).
37. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1339 (1999) (ques-
tioning whether Atticus Finch is really someone other attorneys should strive to be like or if he was
simply a product of the time he lived in, or worse, perhaps not the good and moral person we all
believe him to be); W. Bradley Wendel, Introduction, Our Love Hate Relationship with Heroic Law-
yers, 13 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2003) (focusing on the lawyer as heroic figure, and asking whether the
heroic values of Atticus Finch are unrealistic and overplayed).
38. Michael E. Wolfson, Professional Responsibility as a Lawyering Skill, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 297, 298 (1995). See also Mary C. Daly, Bruce A. Green & Russell G. Pearce, Contextualiz-
ing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
193 (1995) (reviewing the history of professional responsibility within the law school curriculum and
noting students' general dissatisfaction).
39. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 35, at 2 ("I believe that the images conveyed by literature-
whether in high or popular culture, or in the written word or visual image-of lawyers in action are
important to us because they reflect on the ethics and morality of lawyering. ") (citing ROBERT COLES,
THE CALL OF STORIES: TEACHING AND MORAL IMAGINATION (Houghton Mifflin 1989), among
others for "accounts of how literature and stories illuminate issues of professional ethics").
2008]
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regarding what actions to take at specific junctures in one's career."40
Based upon her own teaching experience, Menkel-Meadow believes that
literary lawyers have a critical role in the classroom:
. . . narrative treatments of lawyers' work have become increas-
ingly significant for those of us who teach legal ethics. The moral
challenges faced by the lawyers in John Grisham's or Scott
Turow's legal thrillers (or lawyers in Louis Auchincloss' short
stories and the less well-known novels by Arthur Solmssen) allow
us to examine the decision process, the internal thinking and moral
reasoning of the principal actors and those whose decisions are af-
fected by the choices and decisions lawyers make. The context is
rich, actions are taken, decisions are made and the reader or
viewer can form his or her own judgments about what has oc-
curred - all without any harm having been done to real-world cli-
ents.4'
She further explains that:
Depictions of lawyers' actions in novels . . . allow us to view
(from multiple 'sight-lines') the beginning of the action (what led
up to a particular choice point), the action itself, and the conse-
quences of such actions. Thus we are provided multiple ways of
seeing (backward, sideways, and forward) the consequences of a
lawyer's action, which are often missing from an appellate case as
read in the conventional professional responsibility class.42
Lawyers portrayed in fiction help us learn more about who we are and
who we will become.43 As James R. Elkins observes, "[l]awyers in film
and in fiction become part of the rich storied world in which we try to
imagine, think, act, and live a role, but a role in which we bring who we
are as a person to the work we do, and a life in which the work we do
gives the person we are a meaning it could not otherwise have."44 In this
way, literary lawyers become a form of role model (to emulate or avoid,
depending on the circumstances) and a way of testing strategies with the
benefit of reflection and knowledge from others and ourselves. 45  David
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted).
42. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular Culture: Of Characters
and Acts, 48 UCLA L. REv. 1305, 1309-10 (2001).
43. James R. Elkins, Introduction, Reading/Teaching Lawyer Films, 28 VT. L. REv. 813, 829
(2004).
44. Id.
45. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to Teach
Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 787, 814 (2000) ("Reading stories allows us to try on our own
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M. Spitz also identifies these benefits, noting that in their humanity law-
yers are
often confronted with situations requiring them to either adhere to
ethical canons or follow their natural instincts. .... In fiction,
lawyers are deliberately placed in these positions to "test their
commitments to themselves, their clients, and to the adversary
system," and viewers are ultimately being asked to judge their
character. 46
Those who teach professional responsibility find that "images of lawyers
in . . .literature offer unique opportunities to teach and explore profes-
sionalism[,]" and that literature "elicits powerful responses about the mo-
rality, purpose, role, and identity of lawyers, in addition to traditional
questions of legal ethics. The responses prompt students to reflect on ca-
reer choice, professional persona in the legal world, and their development
as human beings within a web of professional commitments. "47 Clearly,
the study of lawyers as depicted in literature has a place in the law school
curriculum, through law and literature course offerings and through
courses like professional responsibility.
Yet the practice of directing students and practitioners (as well as non-
law readers) to literary lawyers, such as Atticus Finch, as a source of in-
struction or guidance is not without criticism.48 Indeed, there is some
skepticism concerning the accuracy of the depiction of lawyers and judges
by non-lawyer authors. There is also concern that lawyers lack the litera-
ture scholar's ability to draw insights from literature. Moreover, an en-
hanced morality or resolution of internal conflict may not be achieved by
every reader. These concerns cause scholars like Jane Baron to question
whether literature is even an appropriate source of education on matters
like human nature and moral judgment, and if so, how society ought to
resolution of difficult problems as we examine with hindsight, foresight and peripheral vision what
happens in books to other people.")
46. David M. Spitz, Heroes or Villains? Moral Struggles vs. Ethical Dilemmas: An Examination
of Dramatic Portrayals of Lawyers and the Legal Profession in Popular Culture, 24 NOVA L. REV.
725, 741 (2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
47. Alexander Scherr & Hillary Farber, Popular Culture as a Lens on Legal Professionalism, 55
S.C. L. REv. 351, 352 (2003) (citations omitted).
48. For a discussion of literature's utility (or lack thereof) to lawyers and legal interpretation, see
Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J. 1059 (1999).
See also Daniel H. Lowenstein, The Failure of the Act: Conceptions of Law in the MERCHANT OF
VENICE, BLEAK HoUSE, LEs MISERABLES, and Richard Weisberg's PoETRICs, 15 CARDOzo L. REV.
1139, 1241 (1994) (concluding that "[t]o generalize about law or legal questions from the way they are
treated in works of fiction is likely to be futile") and DIETER PAUL POLLOCZEK, LITERATURE AND
LEGAL DISCOURSE: EQuITY AND ETHIcs FROM STERNE TO CONRAD 13 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999)
("On the one hand, there are academic lawyers who remain confident that both fields can learn from
one another. On the other hand, literary critics and legal scholars continue to disagree on questions
concerning the law's legitimacy.").
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determine which works warrant selection. 49 These concerns, however, do
not suggest that literature's potential contributions to the study and prac-
tice of law should be ignored completely. If anything, such arguments
serve as guides for discerning what works to consider and the weight ac-
corded to these works, rather than an outright rejection of literature as a
resource. Criticism like Baron's supports a broadening of the law and
literature canon to include postcolonial works .50 For these reasons, and
given the number of quality postcolonial novels depicting lawyers and
judges, this article suggests that it is time for the legal academy to recog-
nize such works within this body of scholarship.
C. The Postcolonial Perspective
Examining the depiction of lawyers in postcolonial fiction offers at
least two elements beyond the lessons presented in Western literature.
First, the works expose the reader to otherness, an experience foreign to
many lawyers (and readers). This exposure enhances the readers' ability
to identify and reconcile conflicting obligations and emotions. Second,
while the feminist or black perspective in Western literature also may offer
the perspective of otherness, postcolonial works familiarize the reader
with the concerns and perspectives of the global community. 5' These two
elements combine to form an interesting backdrop for addressing the dis-
connect between law and morality.
"Postcolonial" as a category is not easy to define, and indeed, the
very act of attempting to formulate a definition arguably undermines its
49. Baron, supra note 48, at 1066-67. Baron observes:
Within each strand of law and literature, there are deep problems and divisions. Let
us begin with the moral uplift theme of humanist law-and-lit. First, nothing guarantees that
reading literature will actually help attain the goals of the moral uplift project. Surely many
an insensitive brute has read great books without becoming one whit less insensitive or
brutish. And even if it were true that lawyers could learn something from literature about
human nature, nonrational understanding, and moral judgment, it is not clear that literature
is the only-let alone the best-source of education on these matters.
Even assuming both that the moral uplift is worthwhile and that literature can provide
it, there is a question about which books, exactly, should be read .... Suffice it to say that
the more the canon excludes the voices of outsiders and women, the less enriching and
emancipatory the cross of literature with law is likely to be.
Id. (citations omitted).
50. A comprehensive survey of texts used in law and literature courses by 135 law schools re-
veals that postcolonial texts are used rarely, if ever. See Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette, Law and Lit-
erature: Joining the Class Action, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 665 (1995). For additional observations
regarding the canon of law and literature, see Baron, supra note 48, at 1067.
51. For further background on the postcolonial perspective, see Sandra Ponzanesi, Beyond Post-
colonial Theory? Paradoxes and Potentialities of a Necessary Paradigm, in TOwARDS A
TRANSCULTURAL FUTURE: LITERATURE AND SOCIETY IN A 'POST'-COLONIAL WORLD 37-64 (Geof-
frey V. Davis, et. al., eds., 2004).
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12meaning. Nevertheless, it is relevant for purposes of this discussion to
describe the category of postcolonial literature while conceding the prob-
lems inherent in defining such a term. "Postcolonial" as used in this arti-
cle refers to works written in the past half-century by native writers from
formerly colonized countries, that is, literature representative of resistance
rather than privilege. To generalize, postcolonial literature articulates the
identity of formerly colonized people and reclaims their past despite an
inherent otherness. By exposing the incompetence or corruption of a par-
ticular fictionalized empire, postcolonial literature allows us to consider
the shortcomings of our own state and exposes the injustice of its fail-
ings.53 A number of scholars identify the domination of law in postcolo-
nial narratives and focus on the resistance to imperial law as a whole.54
This article, by contrast, centers on the portrayal of lawyers and judges
and on their efforts to reconcile their individual morality with their roles in
the legal system, whether as the colonizer or in the aftermath of the colo-
nial regime.
Focusing on this category of literature, especially the experiences of
colonialism or apartheid, reveals further lessons regarding how to recon-
cile the disconnect between morality and the rule of law. Kristin
Czarnecki explains:
Postcolonial theory interrogates [issues of class, race, and gender]
particularly well by acknowledging that throughout history white
Western culture and values have been imposed on people of color,
most viciously in the colonization of Africa, India, and Native
America. Postcolonial theory, then, examines how colonizer peo-
ple resist their colonization, either by rejecting it outright or, more
often, by manipulating the colonized under the guise of submis-
52. On the difficulties associated with defining the term postcolonial, see DEEPIKA BAHRI,
NATIVE INTELLIGENCE: AESTHETICS, POLITICS, AND POSTCOLONIAL LITERATURE 1-32 (Univ. of
Minnesota Press 2003). Bhari notes that "various and often mutually contradictory impulses character-
ize postcolonial theory and criticism, making the term postcolonial notoriously indefinable and defini-
tive claims virtually impossible . .. ." Id. at 1.
53. See Homi K. Bhabha, Postcolonial Criticism, in REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LITERARY STUDIES 437 (Stephen Greenblatt and Giles
B. Gunn, eds., 1992). Bhabha states that:
Postcolonial perspectives emerge from the colonial testimony of Third World Countries and
the discourses of "minorities" within the geopolitical divisions of east and west, north and
south. They intervene in those ideological discourses of modernity that attempt to give a
hegemonic "normality" to the uneven development and the differential, often disadvan-
taged, histories of nations, races, communities, peoples. They formulate their critical revi-
sions around issues of cultural difference, social authority, and political discrimination in
order to reveal the antagonistic and ambivalent moments within the "rationalizations" of
modernity.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Gary Boire, Ratione officii: Representing Law in Postcolonial Literatures, MOSAIC,
Dec. 1994, at 199, 213 (focusing on postcolonial literary representations of the courtroom trial).
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sion. Yoking together issues of empire, ethnicity, and cultural
production, postcolonial theory compels readers to question what
is valued in different cultures and why.
One potential risk associated with a postcolonial analysis is that focusing
on a story's ethnic stereotypes may reinforce the stereotypes for white
readers. Nevertheless, Czarnecki argues, "that a postcolonial context fos-
ters better comprehension of a dominant culture's effects on the marginal-
ized." 56 Furthermore, as Patrick Lenta observes "[t]hese novels articulate
the experiences of [the colonized] reacting to the social conditions facili-
tated by [the colonizer's purported legitimacy] in a way that is untranslat-
able into legal or academic idioms." 57  Christine Matzke and Suzanne
Muhleisen make a similar point, noting that "postcolonial texts moreover
suggest that power and authority can be investigated through the magnify-
ing glass of other knowledges, against the local or global mainstream, past
and present, or against potential projections of a dominant group and a
(neo-)imperial West."58
Another risk in suggesting that postcolonial works be considered
alongside Western texts is that the reader will "transpose the text into [his
or her] own cultural milieu without attempting to recognize those contexts
must necessarily deracinate those texts. "59 There is a concern that a
reader unfamiliar with the historical and cultural context of a postcolonial
work will "privilege- British or American texts over [postcolonial texts] .
• . simply because the reader cannot comprehend the full resonances of the
text."6° This risk, however, is outweighed by the benefits that an expan-
sion of the traditional canon of law and literature can offer. Kristin
Brandser Kalsem addresses this concern in the context of what she calls
"outlaw texts", that is "[n]ovels... written by and about women" which
"bring perspectives and experiences to the study of law that are absent
from official legal sources." 61 She argues that
55. Kristin Czarnecki, Postcolonial Theory and the Undergraduate Classroom: Teaching "The
Red Convertible", 2 PEDAGOGY: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO TEACHING LITERATURE, LANGUAGE,
COMPOSITION, AND CULTURE 109 (2002).
56. Id. at 112.
57. Patrick Lenta, The Tikoloshe and the Reasonable Man: Transgressing South African Legal
Fictions, 16 LAW & LITERATURE 353, 358 (2004) (Postcolonial novels "confront the law with 'an
ethics of emotion and a phenomenology of relationship' absent from either the sterile, unimaginative,
and monological narratives of the . . . pretensions to objectivity of traditional academic accounts."
(internal punctuation and citation omitted)).
58. CHRISTINE MATZKE AND SUSANNE MUHLEISEN, POSTCOLONIAL POSTMORTEMS: CRIME
FICTION FROM A TRANSCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 5 (Rodopi 2006).
59. JUDITH L. TABRON, POSTCOLONIAL LIrERATURE FROM THREE CONTINENTS 17 (Peter Lang
Publishing 2004).
60. Id.
61. Kristin Brandser Kalsem, Looking for Law in all the "Wrong" Places: Outlaw Texts and Early
Women's Advocacy, 13 S. CAL. REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 273, 323 (2004).
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[olutlaw texts are sources from which we can learn about the
agency and resistance of those whose voices have been excluded
from dominant legal discourse.
[T]he study of outlaw texts has broader implications for the study
of law than its potential impacts on certain specialized fields.
Whether a judge is relying on precedent, a legal scholar is engag-
ing in doctrinal analysis, or a law student is preparing for tomor-
row's class, it is important that all of us who study law be aware
of and critically analyze the significance of the historical exclusion
of certain voices and experiences from traditional legal texts. It
also is crucial to study the signifying practices that have been used
to challenge and resist official legal doctrine.62
Her argument applies with equal force to justify the inclusion of postcolo-
nial works within the canon of law and literature.
As will be evident in the discussion of the four novels in Part III,
postcolonial literature particularly is suited to assist in efforts to under-
stand how lawyers succeed (or fail) in resolving conflicts between obliga-
tions to the law and their personal moral values. The experience of other-
ness, or colonization, that is faced by the characters in these novels high-
lights the need to resolve this conflict and proposes a means for doing so.
Perhaps if more law students and lawyers explored the duality of their role
in the context of postcolonial literature, they would be more comfortable,
or at least prepared, reconciling the disconnect in their work and life.
Also, if more readers considered the duality inherent in lawyers' work via
the context of postcolonial literature, the readers may be more understand-
ing of the seeming contradictions.
III. THE LITERATURE
A. Hamilton Motsamai from Nadine Gordimer's The House Gun
Hamilton Motsamai is a lawyer in Nobel Prize winner Nadine
Gordimer's post-apartheid South African novel The House Gun. Mot-
samai, who is black, is hired by Harald and Claudia Lindgard, a white
professional couple (he a business executive, she a medical doctor), to
defend their son Duncan. Duncan, charged with murder, confessed to
shooting his former male lover, Carl Jespersen, whom he found in the
62. Id. at 323-24.
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arms of Natalie. Natalie is pregnant with a child that might be Duncan's
or Jespersen's.
Duncan selects Motsamai as his lawyer because Motsamai is consid-
ered one of the best lawyers in the country. The reader learns of Mot-
samai's training and credentials early on-though much of the description
is tainted with racial overtones. 63 From humble beginnings-poor, unedu-
cated parents-Motsamai trained in the 1960's at the University of Fort
Hare, one of South Africa's oldest educational institutions, and later in
England, after being exiled from South Africa for political activity.
64
Proving himself via appearances at the Old Bailey and through member-
ship in the prestigious Gray's Inn, Motsamai returned to South Africa in
1990.65 When Harald Lindgard asks a fellow board member about Mot-
samai's reputation, the colleague is quick to describe his virtues, explain-
ing that Motsamai "is known as eminently capable" with "the kind of ag-
gressive spirit-controlled, mind you, by strong intelligence-that puts
him on a high level of competence . . . Very clever-some would say
exceptional .... in fact, Motsamai is providential ... a star was needed
and he appeared in our constellation. ,66 Ilene Durst finds the presence of
a well-regarded attorney like Motsamai a refreshing change from most
fiction portrayals of attorneys, as most portrayals typically depict lawyers
as morally corrupt.67 She is quick and generous with her praise:
[Motsamai] maintains an exemplary professionalism and achieves
his client's legal ends while incorporating an ethic of care into his
63. As just one example of such overtones, consider the following passage:
What they wanted from him was wiliness, a special kind of shrewd ability a lay individual
could not have and that people whose generalized prejudices they used to find distasteful at-
tributed to lawyers who belonged to certain races. Jewish or Indian lawyers, those were
the ones. Would a black lawyer have the same secret resources? Was it a sharpened edge
that could be acquired in legal practice and training? Or was it in the making of a racial
stereotype brought about originally by the necessity of those certain races to find ways of
defeating laws that discriminated against them? In which case, why shouldn't Hamilton
have developed every natural instinct of life-saving wiliness and shrewdness, who better?
Why should he be presumed to have forgone it forever in exchange for the lofty profes-
sional rectitude of an Aryan member of the Bar who had never lived on the Other Side?
Was it there in his chambers, slyly, under the gaze of the framed photographs ....
NADINE GORDIMER, THE HOUSE GUN 144-45 (Penguin Books 1999) (1998) [hereinafter GORDIMER,
THE HOUSE GUN].
64. Id. at 37. The real Fort Hare counts a number of influential leaders amongst its alumni
(including Nelson Mandela), many of whom were expelled for their involvement during apartheid.
See History of the University, Fort Hare University website, http://www.ufh.ac.za/?about=history
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
65. GORDIMER, THE HOUSE GUN, supra note 63, at 37-38.
66. Id.
67. Ilene Durst, The Lawyer's Image, the Writer's Imagination: Professionalism and the Story-
teller's Art in Nadine Gordimer's THE HOUSE GUN, 13 CARDOZO STUD. L & LITERATURE 299, 312-
13 (2001). Incidentally, Durst's article is one of the very few law journal articles located in my
research devoted entirely to a work of postcolonial literature. For the others, see supra note 57; infra
note 108.
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practice, thereby shielding the client and his parents to the extent
possible from the emotional trauma, dissociation and damage done
by civilian encounters with the violence of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Motsamai is empathetic, engaged, and ethical and he re-
spects and graces the institution and society his conduct affects.
He possesses all the desirable traits of the model attorney, which
rarely appear, let alone shine, in literary lawyers of North Ameri-
68
can and Western European fiction.
Indeed, it is refreshing to see this positive example (particularly in a non-
Western literary source); yet the greater meaning of Motsamai's story is
found in a careful study of how he synthesizes his role as lawyer with his
self-identity and how he reconciles the rule of law with his own morality.
Gordimer immediately sets the stage for this study by using the name
"Hamilton" when Motsamai is acting as a non-lawyer and by using the
name "Motsamai" when he is acting as a lawyer. Gordimer further pro-
vides several distinct examples regarding how this differentiation influ-
ences Motsamai's practice and life. Whether intentional or not, Gordimer
is intimately concerned with Motsamai's role differentiation, and Mot-
samai has a unique ability to reconcile his role in the law with his personal
value system. Gordimer attributes this ability to a "confidence" and an
"empathy" gained from Motsamai's experience on the "Other Side" (i.e.
living under apartheid).
The reader sees this confidence in Gordimer's description of the Lind-
gards' situation. She writes:
They were two creatures caught in the headlights of catastrophe.
Nothing between [their son] and the judge, passing sentence, but
Motsamai and his confidence. The embrace of his confidence-
wasn't it the expression of the man, rather than the lawyer, com-
passion that was on the Other Side, inner side, of his patronizing
command, that shell of ego he had had to burnish to get where he
was, granted as the best available for this case, among a choice of
white Senior Counsel.69
As for the empathy, Gordimer states that Motsamai is "[tihe man who
brings from the Other Side the understanding of people in trouble." 70 Not
only does he fulfill the traditional duties of a lawyer, but he also, "is there
to support, to help [the Lindgards] accept in themselves, between them-
68. Durst, supra note 67, at 299.
69. GORDIMER, THE HOUSE GUN, supra note 63, at 128.
70. Id. at 207.
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selves and himself, the natural expression of emotions" 7' experienced by
parents whose son stands accused of murder. Motsamai empathizes with
his clients because he too has experienced otherness, but he keeps the em-
pathy in check.72
The success of Motsamai's defense (he obtains the most minimum sen-
tence ever rendered in a case like this) is attributed to the confidence
drawn from his experience on the other side. As Gordimer explains, "he
was, he made himself, the focus of the court.... [F]rom all the years he
had been shut out on the Other Side of the law he claimed the right to ar-
rogant bearing of its dignity. "73 His success is attributed to his empathy as
well, for example as he "shepherd[s] the parents [to visit their son in his
jail cell after the sentence is handed down and the Lindgards reflect that
they could not] have done without [Motsamai] this one last time. "74 While
we might expect an opposite effect, Motsamai's endurance of injustice
during apartheid fuels his confidence and empathy rather than embittering
him. Motsamai's combination of confidence and empathy serves as a re-
source that he draws upon when faced with the duality of conflicting legal
and moral concerns.
Attorneys often are questioned about their justification for defending a
violent or morally repugnant client, and the Lindgards share this concern,
even though it involves their own son. They ask Motsamai, "Is a lawyer
obliged to take a brief for someone who has said he is guilty? Already
judged himself. What is there to defend?" 75 They simply cannot compre-
hend how one "could take . . . on representation of a self-confessed mur-
derer[,]" 76 echoing a criticism frequently levied against lawyers.
Gordimer explains that Motsamai "did not see, or pretended not to see,
that they thought they were making some challenging disguised demand
for him to do something, anything unethical (as they saw it) in defence of
their son. "77 Motsamai tells them:
Of course a lawyer must take such a briefi The individual has the
right to be judged according to many factors in relation to his con-
fessed act. Circumstances may affect vitally the weight of circum-
stantial evidence. The accused may judge himself, but he cannot
sentence himself. Only the judge can do that. Only on the verdict
of the court. In terms of the kind of sentence likely to be im-
71. Id. at 275.
72. Id. ("Hamilton has to control his empathy, which exists along with his professional satisfac-
tion in an extremely dubious case well defended by one of the best advocates available.")
73. Id. at 231.
74. GORDIMER, THE HOUSE GUN, supra note 63, at 274.
75. Id. at 60.
76. Id. at 145.
77. Id.
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posed, this is the beginning of the case, man! What we concen-
trate on is ensuring that the sentence is not going to be a day
longer, not a degree more punitive than mitigating factors allow.78
Harald further voices society's criticism of lawyers when he is troubled by
what he considers inconsistencies in Motsamai's treatment of clients in his
office versus in the courtroom. As discussed in Part II of this article, it is
not unusual for attorneys to be labeled as inconsistent or deceptive as a
result of this sort of role shifting. After witnessing Motsamai greet the
prosecutor and exchange words followed by laughter, Harald questions
whether justice is merely a performance. "Harald sees Motsamai is enjoy-
ing himself, Duncan's life is material for a professional performance. The
man who brings from the Other Side the understanding of people in trou-
ble, the man in whose hands there is the succoring glass of brandy, is left
behind in chambers. "'9 In the end, however, Harald and Claudia under-
stand that Motsamai's demeanor in the courtroom is a necessary part of
the process and they are thankful they have placed their trust in Mot-
samai.80
Over the course of the representation, Motsamai strikes an interesting
balance in his relationship with Harald and Claudia, strategically allowing
them to see beyond his lawyer persona:
It was not always necessary or desirable to keep the relationship
with clients formal. Taking on a brief means establishing the con-
fidence of human feeling, some sort of give-and-take, with the
family of the life to be defended, even while retaining professional
objectivity. This white couple didn't have the resilience that blacks
have acquired in all their generations of being people in trouble by
the nature of their skins. He knows how to handle these two:
they'll feel they're able to do something for him; that aside about
wanting advice on a career for an ambitious son. 81
On one level Motsamai invites the Lindgards to his home to build trust and
gain their confidence. Motsamai puts the Lindgards at ease by suggesting
that Claudia might provide some career advice for his son who is consider-
ing becoming a doctor. Motsamai invites them into his home to take their
minds off the circumstances of their son. On another level, however, ex-
tending a dinner invitation to the Lindgards reconciles Motsamai's own
78. Id. at 60.
79. GORDIMER, THE HOUSE GUN, supra note 63, at 207.
80. Id. at 248. ("It's a good thing you trusted him. There's so much it's difficult for people like
us to understand-about the process, I mean.")
81. Id. at 163.
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feelings of disconnect. He opens our minds to consider creative ways of
engaging with clients that may make practice more fulfilling and that may
allow lawyers to merge their humanity with their lawyer-selves.
Consider Motsamai's strategy. He anticipates and addresses the emo-
tions of his clients, and he acts on their behalf when they cannot act for
themselves. Motsamai allows them to see beyond his lawyer-self, but
assumes the role of lawyer when necessary and appropriate. He does not
ignore injustice; he confronts it. In crafting a successful defense, Mot-
samai avoids rationalizations or technicalities. These are the choices Mot-
samai makes in his pursuit of justice, choices rooted in confidence and
empathy borne from his experience of otherness and choices that enable
him to reconcile legal obligations with his morality.
B. The Judge from Kiran Desai's The Inheritance of Loss
Let us now consider, in contrast to Motsamai, the judge from Kiran
Desai's Inheritance of Loss, for which Desai won the 2006 Man Booker
Prize for Fiction. Although the judge plays a lesser role in the novel, the
internal struggle to balance his individual sense of justice with his position
in the law is a dominant thread in the work (and parallels the plight of
J.M. Coetzee's magistrate in various important ways as discussed in Part
III.B.). The reader meets the judge as an embittered, elderly man at the
end of his career. He is living in a run down home in the Himalayas with
his granddaughter and a cook. His life is exposed through a series of
flashbacks. The judge recalls, as a child, the oppression and injustice felt
by his family as Indian nationals living under British rule. Yet his father
actually encourages the judge to serve as an arm of the British Empire and
sends him to school to secure a position 2 with the Indian Civil Service
(ICS).83
The judge's upbringing, like that of Motsamai, is an experience of
otherness. The judge similarly receives his legal education in England,
attending Cambridge, which he finds demoralizing and isolating. He stud-
ies twelve hours a day, going for entire days without speaking a word and
finding that his "mind had begun to warp; [growing] stranger to himself
than he was to those around him, [finding] his own skin odd-colored, his
82. His father's encouragement is somewhat ironic, given that as a child his "father owned a
modest business procuring false witnesses to appear in court. (Who would think his son, so many
years later, would become a judge?)." KIRAN DESAI, THE INHERITANCE OF LOSs 64 (Grove Press
2006).
83. The ICS administered British colonial policy in India during the British Raj (that is, the Brit-
ish rule between 1858 and 1947). Only a small number of Indians were admitted into the exclusive
ICS. While these positions were powerful, during the 1930's Indian members found themselves con-
flicted between the required loyalty to the British Empire and the Indian movement for independence.
For a detailed history of the ICS, see The Indian Civil Service, FRASER'S MAGAZINE, Oct. 1873, at
433-46.
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own accent peculiar. "4 Despite diligent study, the judge fails to achieve a
sufficient exam score for admission to the ICS, but after an affirmative
action effort to "Indianize" the service he makes the cut, barely.85 As a
result, the judge is one of the first Indians to become a member of the ICS
during the last days of the British regime. The judge fulfills his family's
collective dream of a better life, welcomed home by brass band and fire-
works, now a part of the very regime that oppressed his ancestors.86
Initially, the judge believed that the power of his position would ame-
liorate the experience of otherness his family and he endured. Desai tells
us that "he relished his power over the classes that had kept his family
pinned under their heels for centuries. . . ., Yet, unlike Motsamai, who
harnesses his experience on the other side to become the best possible de-
fense counsel, the judge allows his experience of otherness to corrode him
rather than command. For the judge, his role in the law is valuable only
for the calming factor of "the tight calendar" of a "touring official in the
civil service" and the "constant exertion of [his] authority.
The judge sees injustice and internally loathes it, but he does not ac-
tively intervene to stop the injustice. For example, witnessing the beating
of another Indian boy while he studied in England, "the future judge,
walking by, on his way home with a pork pie for his dinner-what had he
done? He hadn't said anything. He hadn't done anything. He hadn't
called for help. He'd turned and fled." 89 He tries to rationalize his inac-
tion, observing that:
In this life . . . you must stop your thoughts if you wished to
remain intact, or guilt and pity would take everything from you,
even yourself from yourself.
This was why he had retired. India was too messy for justice;
it ended only in humiliation for the person in authority. 90
His inaction in the face of injustice continues once he becomes a judge and
presides over cases:
[H]e heard cases in Hindi, but they were recorded in Urdu by the
stenographer and translated by the judge into a second record in
English, although his own command of Hindi and Urdu was tenu-
84. DESAI, supra note 82, at 45.
85. Id. at 129.
86. Id. at 181.
87. Id. at 69.
88. Id. at 69.
89. DESAI, supra note 82, at 228-29.
90. Id. at 289.
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ous; the witnesses who couldn't read at all put their thumbprints at
the bottom of "Read Over and Acknowledged Correct," as in-
structed. Nobody could be sure how much of the truth had fallen
between languages, between languages and illiteracy; the clarity
that justice demanded was nonexistent.91
The judge is annoyed by this charade of justice, but does nothing to rem-
edy it. Rather, he plays along with the system all the way to a seat on the
high court, becoming ever-more miserable, with "[h]is photograph, . . .
thus annoyed .... was still up on the wall, in a parade of history glorify-
ing the progress of Indian law and order." 92 Again rationalizations fail
him as "[hie realized truth was best looked at in tiny aggregates, for many
baby truths could yet add up to one big size unsavory lie. "93 As he ages,
the judge wallows in his detachment and cynicism, feeling affection only
for his dying dog, Mutt. When Mutt's life comes to an end, the judge
reflects:
A man wasn't equal to an animal, not one particle of him. Human
life was stinking, corrupt, and meanwhile there were beautiful
creatures who lived with delicacy on the earth without doing any-
one any harm. "We should be dying," the judge almost wept....
The judge had lost his clout. . . . A bit of "sir sahib huzoor" for
politeness' sake, but that was just residual veneer now; he knows
what they really thought of him. He remembered all of a sudden
why he had gone to England and joined the ICS; it was clearer
than ever why-but now that position of power was gone, frittered
away in years of misanthropy and cynicism.
94
The judge's unhappiness at the end of his life stems directly from the
choices he made when he assumed his power in the law.
The judge's story illustrates both a circumstance where the law alone
fails to achieve justice and a revelation about the consequences when one
charged with responsibilities to administer the law fails to act upon his or
her humanity. We learn that the desire for power, alone, cannot sustain a
meaningful or satisfying career in the law. More significantly, we see that
adherence to the rule of law, rather than one's conscience, at times can
result in the very injustice that the law is supposed to redeem. The judge
allows himself to be silenced by the system he loathes, though he intended
for the position of power to give him, his family, and his people a voice.
91. Id. at 69-70.
92. Id. at 70.
93. Id. at 71.
94. DESAI, supra note 82, at 320.
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The disconnect the judge experiences is palpable and cannot be ignored.
Desai permits her readers to see beyond the formal portrait of the judge
hanging in the wall in the high court. From this vantage point, the readers
are able to consider how the judge's end can be avoided in their own law
practices and lives.
The judge and Motsamai both endure life on the other side, an experi-
ence not shared by the majority of law students, lawyers, or readers gen-
erally. Through their stories, however, the readers are able to imagine
what it would be like to exist in their world and are able to learn from the
choices they make without having to go through the same process them-
selves. This is not to say that one must experience injustice like that en-
dured under apartheid or colonization or that reading about it could possi-
bly replicate the experience. But students and practitioners alike may find
inspiration in these stories as they develop a personal philosophy about the
kind of lawyer they will become.
C. The Magistrate from J. M. Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians
The character of the civil magistrate from Nobel Prize winner J. M.
Coetzee's Waiting for the Barbarians parallels in many ways the experi-
ences of the judge in Desai's Inheritance of Loss, though we might not
expect this at first glance because the magistrate is a member of the domi-
nant, colonizing class. Stationed in an isolated frontier outpost, he is in
theory (though perhaps not in practice) an arm of the Empire. He consid-
ers himself "a responsible official in the service of the Empire, serving out
my days on this lazy frontier, waiting to retire. "95 His responsibilities
include collecting tithes and taxes, administering communal lands, provid-
ing for the garrison, supervising junior officers, overseeing trade and pre-
siding over court twice weekly.96 Despite rumors about the beginnings of
a war with the barbarians, he is content to live "a quiet life in quiet
times," and privately mocks the idea that the barbarian tribes are arming. 97
The magistrate's peaceful existence begins to unravel, however, when he
is visited by Colonel Joll from the Third Bureau (the "most important di-
vision of the Civil Guard nowadays"), a brutal inquisitor who relies on
torture to obtain truth.9 8
Joll uses his interrogation techniques on a group of harmless nomads
and fishermen rounded up as his so-called prisoners; afterwards, the mag-
istrate visits them in the barracks hall used as a jail and is horrified to find
95. J.M COETZEE, WAiNG FOR THE BARBARIANS 8 (Penguin Books 1982) (1980).
96. Id.
97. Id. ("Of this unrest I myself saw nothing. In private I observed that once in every generation,
without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians.")
98. Id. at 2.
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them "sick, famished, damaged, terrified." 99 The magistrate is disgusted
at his role as servant to the Empire, torn by his values of human rights.
His gut reaction, like that of Desai's judge, is to retreat to ignorance. He
fantasizes about the solace it might bring, but it is too late-he says:
I know somewhat too much; and from this knowledge, once one
has been infected, there seems to be no recovering. I ought never
to have taken my lantern to see what was going on . . . . On the
other hand, there was no way, once I had picked up the lantern,
for me to put it down again. 1°
The magistrate cannot close his mind to the plight of the prisoners, so
when Joll leaves, he "order[s] that the prisoners be fed, that the doctor be
called in [and] . . . that arrangements be made to restore the prisoners to
their former lives as soon as possible, as far as possible. 1'01 Realistically,
however, little can be done, and the magistrate takes no significant action
to prevent future abuse. Like Desai's judge, he turns to rationalizations to
ease his conscience. The magistrate tells himself that he is doing all he
can given his position as magistrate and that the law is not always just.
He considers resigning but does not because "someone else will be ap-
pointed to bear the shame of office, and nothing will have changed. ,
10 2
As he lectures to a peasant boy who fled his criminal sentence of army
service to visit his mother and sister:
"We cannot just do as we wish," I lectured him. "We are all sub-
ject to the law, which is greater than any of us .... You feel that
it is unjust, I know, that you should be punished for having the
feelings of a good son. You think you know what is just and what
is not. I understand. We all think we know .... But we live in a
world of laws . . . a world of the second-best. There is nothing
we can do about that. We are fallen creatures. All we can do is
uphold the laws, all of us, without allowing the memory of justice
to fade." 10
3
After the lecture, the magistrate sentences him and then feels "uneasy
shame" which he tries to rationalize away: "When some men suffer un-
justly . . . it is the fate of those who witness their suffering to suffer the
shame of it."'04 These excuses ultimately fail him.
99. Id. at 24.
100. COETZEE, supra note 95, at 21.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 139.
103. Id. at 138-39 (internal punctuation omitted).
104. Id. at 139.
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The magistrate cannot ignore the torture, but he cannot rationalize his
role in the Empire that allows it. He tries confronting Joll directly but to
no avail:
"Those pitiable prisoners you brought in-are they the enemy
I must fear? Is that what you say? You are the enemy, Colonel!"
I can restrain myself no longer. I pound the desk with my fist.
"You are the enemy, you have made the war, and you have given
them all the martyrs they need-starting not now but a year ago
when you committed your first filthy barbarities here! History
will bear me out!"
[Joll dismisses him impassively:] "Nonsense. There will be no
history, the affair is too trivial."' 05
The magistrate questions Joll, "How do you find it possible to eat after-
wards, after you have been. . . working with people?" 1' 6 He struggles to
understand how Joll functions:
"Do not misunderstand me, I am not blaming you or accusing
you, I am long past that. Remember, I too have devoted a life to
the law, I know its processes, I know that the workings of justice
are often obscure. I am only trying to understand. I am trying to
understand the zone in which you live. I am trying to imagine
how you breathe and eat and live from day to day. But I cannot!
That is what troubles me!,,
07
He accomplishes a degree of satisfaction in the confrontation, but it is not
enough. The disconnection between his role in the Empire's law and his
value system renders him impotent.
On the surface the magistrate's actions (or inaction) are less than in-
spiring. Yet his internal struggle is in many ways prescient. The magis-
trate holds at his core an admirable set of beliefs, including a:
... belief in the power and efficacy of the judiciary system; belief
in "civilsation" [sic] and the continual progress of humankind; an
abhorrence of violence, accompanied by an attitude of tolerance
and rationality; a capacity for fairly ruthless self-scrutiny and a
sense of guilt that can be incapacitating; and, more significant than
105. COETZEE, supra note 95, at 114.
106. Id. at 126.
107. Id.
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all of these, a belief in individual autonomy and freedom of
choice.1°8
Of course the problem is that "[d]espite the magistrate's various attempts
to set himself in opposition to Joll and his kind, [the magistrate's] passive
acceptance of their sadistic practices renders him complicit with their
crimes.""' 9 The magistrate's moral compass does not comport with the
rule of law he is charged to uphold and enforce. He ought to be able to
use the authority of his position in the law to stop the injustice he wit-
nesses, but he fails to take action.
Motsamai, the judge, and the magistrate all profess, to a certain ex-
tent, similar idealistic principles, but only Motsamai succeeds in making
them an authentic part of his practice. So, what lessons might be learned
from a character like the judge or the magistrate? In the words of one
writer, "Coetzee's tale is the story of all of us: complicit, but asleep. We
worry that if we pick up the lantern, we won't be able to put it down."' 10
We examine the judge's and the magistrate's endeavors to ignore, rational-
ize, and confront in the face of injustice, and we learn how these efforts
fail them. We see how power may impinge upon one's ethical faculties.
Motsamai, disenfranchised, employs his experience to justify his reliance
on personal values in successfully reconciling his role in the law with his
morality. The judge and magistrate, in positions of authority, fail to act
on their internal moral compass, and consequently, become powerless in
the wake of their cynicism and complicity. Ultimately, their stories force
the reader to confront the consequences of not acting on one's inner voice
or convictions.
D. Vera Stark from Nadine Gordimer's None to Accompany Me
The attorney in Nadine Gordimer's novel, None to Accompany Me is a
contrast to Motsamai, the magistrate, and the judge. Vera Stark is a white
lawyer living in South Africa. Stark is similar in position to the magis-
trate, as she is a member of the colonizing class and is morally outraged at
the plight of the colonized. Yet Stark makes very different choices in act-
ing on her outrage, choices that enable her to reconcile her role in the law
and her morality in a fashion similar to Motsamai. Stark left a "promising
108. Teresa Dovey, Waiting for the Barbarians: Allegory of Allegories, in CRITICAL PERSPECTnVES
ON J.M. COETZEE 142 (Graham Huggan & Stephen Watson eds., 1996). See also Sinkwan Cheng,
Civilization and the Two Faces of Law: J.M. Coetzee's WAITNG FOR THE BARBARIANS, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2349, 2352-53 (2003) ("[The magistrate] understands the important role of prohibition and
how only the ability to say 'No'-the ability to impose a limit dividing the acceptable from the unac-
ceptable-makes justice and ethics possible.")
109. Cheng, supra note 108, at 2354.
110. WILLIAM AYERS, TEACHING TOwARD FREEDOM: MORAL COMMITMENT AND ETICAL
ACTION IN THE CLASSROOM 123 (Beacon Press 2004).
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position in a prosperous legal firm" to oppose the apartheid regime.111
She is described as "a fixture at the Legal Foundation. Although she has
refused to take the executive directorship which has been offered to her,
preferring-selfishly, she says-not to spend time on administration, no
one can imagine the Foundation running without her." 112 Not a typical
legal aid organization, the Foundation "came into existence in response to
the plight of black communities"113 under apartheid "looking for the legal
loopholes that [would] delay or frustrate or-occasionally-win out" 114
over the process of systematic, race-based removal of people from their
homes. 115  In the aftermath of apartheid, the Foundation began to assist
"communities whose removal [it] had been unsuccessful in stalling ... to
present the case for having restored to them the village, the land, their
place, which was taken from them and allotted to whites. " 116 Stark is
appointed to serve on the Technical Committee on Constitutional Issues as
the country rewrites its constitution. 17 Stark is a powerful woman in post-
apartheid South Africa, but, unlike the judge, power is not her motivation
or her guide.
As with Hamilton Motsamai, Gordimer again permits the reader to
know both Vera, the individual, and Mrs. Stark, the professional. Stark
allows her work at the Foundation to become all-consuming, in part be-
cause of her passion for correcting the wrongs of apartheid and in part
because she wishes to avoid her failing marriage. Gordimer states that
"[t]hrough the will to formulate the Foundation's understanding of the
meaning of land [that belonged to those displaced during apartheid], her
own life was gathered in. She had no thought, no space in herself for any-
thing else."" 8 Yet, throughout the course of the novel, Stark is on a con-
stant search for truth, both as a lawyer for the Foundation and in her per-
sonal life. Stark acknowledges that this is a continual process, as she ex-
plains to her daughter that what she wants is "[t]o find out about my life.
The truth. In the end. That's all. . . . I'm getting there. . . .Working
through-what shall I say-dependencies." 1 9
Like the other characters discussed in this article, Stark reflects and
searches for meaning in her life and her work under the law. The recon-
ciliation between her role in the law and her individual values is one of
111. NADINE GORDIMER, NONE TO ACCOMPANY ME 17 (Penguin Books 1995) (1994) [hereinafter
GORDIMER, NONE TO ACCOMPANY ME].
112. Id. at 11-12.
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id.
116. GORDIMER, NONE TO ACCOMPANY ME, supra note I11, at 13.
117. Id. at 277.
118. Id. at 164.
119. Id. at 313.
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realistic hopefulness. Stark embodies progress. Through Stark, Gordimer
compels the reader to confront difficult ideas:
Gordimer's strength, here and elsewhere, is that she confronts
bold and dangerous questions and gives them form without offer-
ing a ready answer. How can one keep one's hands clean while
working against a dirty regime that does not shrink from using any
means at its disposal? Does freedom consist in losing the past bit
by bit? Why is there always someone who cannot afford to re-
member and others who are incapable of forgetting, however
much they want to?120
Toward the novel's end we find Stark alone in her home, reflecting on:
[E]verything that had come and gone within and around her, Mrs.
Stark[ and Vera; men, the children she bore them, the communi-
ties she saved or failed to save from removal, the deaths of and the
death-threats to companions, . . . the return of faces from prison
and exile . . . the [constitutional] committee she came home from
where the needs and frustrations and ambitions of more than three
centuries were meant to be reconciled and achieved on paper in
some immutable syntax.
12 1
She knows that no law can ever bring justice to wrongs committed against
her clients. She has no illusion about politics or her part in it. 122 At the
same time, Stark is equally realistic and hopeful, finding purpose in the
process, whether she is advocating for her clients, rewriting the country's
constitution, or in her words, "moving alone towards the self." 123 Unlike
the magistrate, Stark does not worry about being unable to put the lantern
down; instead, she uses it to light her way. Rather than becoming over-
whelmed by the senseless violence and injustice of colonialism-which
leaves the judge cynical and the magistrate impotent-Stark is inspired by
it.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the law collides with moral values the consequences are pro-
found. Practitioners experience disillusionment and dissatisfaction. Stu-
120. Per Wastberg, Nadine Gordimer and the South African Experience, NOBEL LAUREATES IN
SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY: VOICES OF DIFFERENT CULTURES 33, 42 (Anders Hallengren
ed., 2004).
121. GORDIMER, NONE TO ACCOMPANY ME, supra note 111, at 304.
122. Id. at 305.
123. Id. at 306.
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dents feel disconnected from their pre-lawyer selves. Non-lawyers per-
ceive the profession as dishonest and deceitful. As this article has re-
vealed, postcolonial literature presents one possible tool in our effort to
identify and reconcile the tension between lawyers' obligations to the law
and lawyers' own moral compasses. Through postcolonial literature the
reader is able to witness how the characters "make their moral choices
behind private doors and in the public sphere." 124 Why is postcolonial
literature especially appropriate for such a pursuit? The stories of these
postcolonial literary, legal figures offer meaningful contributions to the
discourse concerning the general depiction of lawyers in literature.
Gordimer, in reflecting on her own writing, says that postcolonial fiction
can "'encompass all the things that go unsaid among other people and in
yourself . . ,. . Likewise, postcolonial authors like "Coetzee do] not
seek to speak with [their] readers; nor do[] [they] offer comforting, ...
moral certainties. Instead, perhaps, [they] seekU to encourage the reader
to self-critique in the performative process of the act of imagination that is
reading." 1 26 The inclusion of postcolonial works among the canon of law
and literature expands the reader's perspective into other cultures and
worldviews. The reader bears witness to the experience of otherness,
which in turn refines the reader's perception of the world and the respon-
sibilities of lawyers. Moreover, the unique attributes of postcolonial lit-
erature offer an especially compelling depiction of the disconnect attorneys
face between the rule of law and their individual morality. This portrayal
inevitably invites dialog about reconciling the law and the reader's moral-
ity-a much-needed conversation that has been silenced by the law school
curriculum and by the culture of legal practice.
The most important contribution provided by postcolonial works, like
the novels discussed in this article, is that they offers a viable means for
identifying and exploring (and perhaps, at least in some cases, reconciling)
the disconnect between law and individual morality.127 Postcolonial litera-
ture shows that the impact of colonization can inspire or immobilize both
the colonizer and the colonized. What seems to separate the inspired are
the qualities of confidence, empathy, hopefulness, and progression, as
observed in Motsamai and Stark. Yet all four stories provide a frame for
discussing and imagining how their lessons might apply in the reader's
own life and practice. In doing so, the lawyers may become more capable
124. Wastberg, supra note 120, at 34.
125. Id. at 43 (quoting Nadine Gordimer in Nadine Gordimer and Stephen Clingman, The Future
is Another Country, TRANSITION 132 (1992)).
126. James Meffan & Kim L. Worthington, Ethics before Politics: J.M. Coetzee's Disgrace,
MAPPING THE ETHICAL TURN: A READER IN ETHICs, CULTURE, AND LITERARY THEORY 131, 147
(Todd F. Davis & Kenneth Womack eds., 2001).
127. Moreover, such works provoke necessary but difficult conversations that belong in the law
school classroom and in the workplace.
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of reconciling the disconnect, and non-lawyers may become more under-
standing, if not forgiving, of the seemingly contradictory nature of the law
and those who practice or administer it.
Though very different in background and situation, Motsamai, the
magistrate, the judge, and Stark all offer lessons to lawyers, lawyers-to-
be, and readers generally regarding reconciling the law and individual
morality in the pursuit of justice, whether as examples to emulate or as
examples to avoid. Each character reveals that the rule of law alone does
not equate necessarily with justice; at times lawyers and readers must act
upon their own humanity. Students, practitioners, and scholars would do
well to incorporate the lessons offered by these postcolonial literary fig-
ures into their law studies and practice.
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